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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NOTES
WHEN DOES THE OWNER WHO HAS PARTED WITH PHYSICAL
POSSESSION HAVE SUCH RIGHT TO POSSESSION AS WILL
ENABLE HIM TO RECOVER UNDER AN INSURANCE




There has been a r'ecent change in the provisions and conditions of these poli-
cies, but, generally, they insure against theft, robbery and pilferage, except by a
person or persons living in the same household or by one of the insured's employees.
These policies also except any loss suffered where the insured voluntarily parts
with either title or possession of the vehicle, whether or not he was induced to do
so by any fraudulent scheme, trick, devis-e or false pretense of any nature. The pol-
icies also exclude against recovery in the case of any wrongful conversion, em-
bezzlement or secretion by a mortgagee, vendee, or any other person in lawful pos-
session of the insured property under a mortgage, conditional sale, lease or other
contract or agreement, whether written or verbal.
Most states have held that the provision against theft of an automobile does
not preclude a recovery where the owner has merely placed it in temporary custody
of another person without intending actual transfer of possession.'
These cases treat one having temporary possession of the vehicle, either to
repair the vehicle or for some other purpose of the owner, as having only custody.
Some courts have gone so far as to hold that the delivery of possession to one who
might later acquire the right of permanent possession is delivery of only tem-
porary custody. That appears to this writer to ignore the prohibition in the policy
against the voluntary parting with possession by the owner.2 Those cases which
reach the same result, where voluntary possession is turned over to another party,
for a purpose other than to do something for the owner, and then later an intent
to steal the car comes to the mind of the prospective purchaser or the party in
possession, also apparently ignore the prohibition in the policy against a voluntary
turning over of possession. The question arises as to when the intent to convert
must come into being.3
*Judge of the Clearfield County courts, 1944-1954; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1921.
1 See 109 A. L. R. 1080; Bennett Chevrolet, A. L. R. 1077; 22 R. C. L. 80; Security Insurance
v. Sellers, Salmons & Signor Motor Co., 235 S. W. 617 (1921).
2 Tripp v. United States Fidelity Insurance Co., 44 P.2d 236 (1935).
3 Note under Larceny, 32 Am. Jur., § 56, p. 948, particularly the statement on p., 960 to the effect
that the felonious intent must exist at the time of the taking and carrying away, with the exceptions
noted there. See also 52 C. J. S. 826.
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In the case of the National Safe Deposit Company v. Stead,4 the Supreme
Court stated as follows:
"Both in common speech and in legal terminology, there is no
word more ambiguous in its meaning than possession. It is interchange-
ably used to describe an actual and constructive possession which often so
shade into each other that it is difficult to say where one ends and the
other begins. A constructive possession is defined to be a possession in
law without possession in fact. Personal property in the hands of an
agent or bailee has been held to be in the constructive possession of the
bailor."
Those cases holding that the intent to commit larceny can come into being after
possession is once obtained apparently give a wider definition to the term "theft"
than is given to "larceny".
In Allen v. Berkshire Mutual Fire Insurance Company,6 the Vermont court
said:
"Theft is a wider term than larceny, induding other forms of wrong-
ful deprivation of the property of another and acts constituting embezzle-
ment may be properly so called."
But, in that case, the car owner had directed the purchaser to return the car.
The purchaser had promised to return it the following Monday, so the Vermont
court pointed out that the purchaser was only a naked bailee of the car.
In the case of Jacobson et al. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,6 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the lower court and directed a judgment in
favor of the defendant averring that there had been a voluntary parting and sur-
render of possession of the car. The Minnesota court pointed out the difference
between possession, constructive possession and custody. In this case, the plaintiff
operated a garage and was approached by a prospective purchaser who wanted to
trade in another car. A tentative deal was made in which he was to receive an old
car and a check for $375.00. The prospective purchaser took the car for a ride
before the check had been given and never returned with it. The lower court held
that the automobile had been stolen. The question was whether or not the dealer
had voluntarily parted with possession within the meaning of the exclusionary
clause of the policy. The plaintiff claimed the purchaser only acquired custody of
the automobile, while the defendant contended he had obtained possession. After
pointing out that at common law larceny, required a trespass, that is, the taking
from the possession of another without the consent of the owner, the court said
this principle was later modified in the cases of servant, and the rule as to fraudu-
lent conversion came into being. Later, as to the master and servant relationship,
it was held that the master had constructive possession of the car, while the physical
4 232 U.S. 58, 58 L. Ed. 504 (1914).
5 168 Ad. 698 (1933).
6 46 N. W.2d 868 (1951).
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possession was in the servant. The court defined constructive possession as where
the owner intentionally gives physical possession of the property to another for
the purpose of having him do some act for the owner either to or with the prop-
erty. In the Jacobson case the court stated:
"If the controlling reason or primary purpose for which the sur-
render of possession is made belongs to the owner, he retains constructive
possession. Where the owner retains constructive possession, the party
to whom bare control of the property has been entrusted for the owner's
purpose does not have possession but only custody."7
The Minnesota Supreme Court said that unless an exclusionary clause could
be held to have no meaning at all, it is difficult to understand how one can give it
any meaning other than the exclusion coverage of voluntary parting with actual
possession. The court continued:
"It follows that, if the owner voluntarily surrenders physical pos-
session of his automobile to a third party with the intent that the reci pent
third party shall exercise exclusive dominion or control of the vehide,
temporarily or otherwise, solely or primarily for its use or purpose...
as disinguished from the use or purpose for the direct benefit of the
owner... then the insured has voluntarily surrendered possession within
the meaning of the exclusionary clause of the policy and there is no in-
surance coverage. '"8
The court then went on to say that the fact the owner, in surrendering physical
control, might have been motivated by the desire of some indirect benefit, was im-
material. In this regard, the court concluded:
"In other words, a voluntary surrender of possession, within
the meaning of the policy's exclusionary clause, is effective only when
the surrender of physical control is accompanied by an intent that the
control so surrendered, though it be of only temporary duration, shall be
exclusively vested in the recipient and shall by him be exercised, at his
pleasure, for the immediate and direct accomplishment of a purpose
or use b'elonging to such recipient." 9
Reviewing the Pennsylvania cases, we have the recent case of Hilliard Lumber
Company v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company,10 in which the Court said,
"By theft is meant larceny in its common law sense."
Th' Court then continued:
"At common law, larceny consists in the taking and carrying away
of the personal property of another with the mind of a thief; that is,
with the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property."
Thus, we see that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has said that theft in auto-
mobile policies means larceny in its common law sense.
7 46 N. W.2d 868, 871 (1951).
8 46 N. W.2d 868, 872 (1951).
9 Ibid.
10 175 Pa. Super. 94, 96 (1954).
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In Slomowitz v. Union Insurance Company of Canton, Ltd.," a car was
taken from a garage by a former employee. After saying that the felonious intent
may be established from circumstantial evidence, and also after saying that the same
degree of proof was not required to prove the larceny as would be required in a
criminal case, the court said the question as to whether or not there was a criminal
intent when the car was taken was for the jury.
In Seither, Jr. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturing Association Casualty Insurance
Company et al.,12 a car was put in a garage for repair and the garageman took it
out and wrecked it. The court said there must be a felonious intent to appropriate
another's property permanently, and the burden rests on the plaintiff to convince
the jury by a preponderance of the evidence of the intent to steal the car. In this
case the Pennsylvania Superior Court said there was no 'evidence that would sustain
such an intent, and the judgment of the lower Court was reversed.
In Gillespie v. Export Insurance Company,13 a person drove the car of an-
other away from a party and the Superior Court said there was no felonious intent to
steal the car shown, so the judgment was reversed.
In a recent case, 14 Judge Ivan Walker of 'Centre County, specially presiding,
quoted the case of Hilliard Lumber Company v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty
Company,15 and stated that theft meant larceny in its common law sense. In this
case the plaintiff alleged that he had turned the motor vehicle over to a prospec-
tive purchaser for a ten days trial. There were no restrictions as to where the trial
was to be held or the manner in which the car was to be driven during that period.
Judge Walker held that the plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden on him of
showing a theft by a preponderance of the evidence.
We therefore fLeel that in Pennsylvania, if we exclude those cases of a master
and servant or those cases where a car is taken to a garage or where goods are left
with someone at a hotel for something to be done to them for the owner, that
where voluntary possession is delivered to another with the intention that physical
possession may never be returned to the original owner, the exclusionary provision
of the policy comes into effect. The plaintiff must clearly show, by creditable
evidence, such facts as take it out of the exclusionary provision of the policy.
11 90 Pa. Super. 366 (1927).
12 104 Pa. Super. 260, 159 Atd. 53 (1932).
18 114 Pa. Super. 398, 174 At. 602 (1934).
14 Bernard W. McBee and Harry Kuhn v. Carpenter Mutual Fire Insurance Co., tried in Clearfield
County, No. 355, November Term, 1952.
15 175 Pa. Super. 94 (1954).
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